Evidence for Theism
9
Introduction
Before moving to the first argument for the existence of God, it will be helpful to note a few preliminary points.
The Scope of the Arguments The nine arguments that follow are matched to the occurrence of the phenomena they discuss. The first set deals with the existence, origin and structure of the universe; the second, with the origin of life on Earth; and the third, with human mental and moral experience. It is significant that the claimed evidence for the existence of God should range across so many fundamental aspects of reality. This is just what we would expect to find if theism were true. God, if he exists, is the ultimate explanation for the universe, life, consciousness and morality and an isolated cluster of arguments around mental experience alone, say, or evolutionary biology alone, would not command the same attention. A prima facie evaluation of the scope of the evidence suggests that it is consistent with the truth of theism. This is the first preliminary point to note.
A Cumulative Case for Theism Theism is the claim that, There exists an immaterial spirit who is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, necessary, eternal and perfectly good. The second point to note is that none of the arguments that follow on its own make it more probable than not this proposition is true. Rather, each argument captures a single feature of the proposition. The Modal Cosmological Argument, for instance, establishes the necessity of a transcendent Necessary Being; the Kalam Cosmological Argument, a transcendent Necessary Being with conscious volition; the Argument from Cosmic Teleology, a transcendent Necessary Being with conscious volition that is of incomprehensible intelligence and power—and so on. The skeptic is not therefore justified in dismissing an argument by saying, "Even if it obtains, it does not prove that the entity postulated is God," because this is a point the theist himself is careful to make. The nine arguments taken together form a cumulative case for theism.
Evaluating the Arguments The third point to note is that the arguments for the existence of God are not hard proofs. This, however, does not count against theism for the excellent reason that, outside of mathematics and symbolic logic, there are no hard proofs. In natural theology, as in every other philosophical and scientific enterprise, we will be dealing with arguments whose premises must be weighed for their plausibility or probability—and this goes for arguments for atheism as well as theism. In each case, an argument will be a successful argument if and only if it has a valid logical structure and its premises are more plausible or probable than their negations: This, in turn, will make its conclusion more plausibly or probably true than false and we will be then rationally obligated to give it our assent. [1]
I think this is an especially important point because the skeptic often makes the mistake of thinking that he can reject an argument for the existence of God, or a premise in it, by suggesting the mere possibility of its negation. This is a valid strategy in response to certain modal propositions. Thus the logic of the proposition, If a man is married then, necessarily, he has a wife is invalidated by the possibility of a case of same sex marriage: If it is possible that a married man has a husband, then it is not necessarily the case that he has a wife. But the proposition, All the available evidence points to a beginning of the universe is not invalidated by claiming that it is possible that the evidence is misleading and the universe is past eternal. "Possibilities," as William Lane Craig reminds us, "come cheap." To discharge this premise the skeptic needs to demonstrate that it is on balance more plausible or probable that the universe is past eternal than finite.
Hume’s Objection from Uniqueness A final point: The first three of the following arguments for the existence of God all involve inferences about the nature and origin of the universe. Such inferences are sometimes met with an objection that goes back at least to David Hume and which, to avoid repetition, I will address once here: Hume argued that inferences are made after an examination of many cases of a similar kind and are not permissible when we are dealing with a unique case. Since there is only one universe, his objection goes, it is impossible to make inferences about it and wrong to apply to it a principles that have been inferred from local cases within the universe.
Swinburne begins his reply to this by noting that it has a consequence that is both surprising and unwelcome, even to its proponents: It entails that physical cosmology cannot reach justified conclusions about the size, age or density of the universe (since it is the only one of which we have knowledge) and also that physical anthropology could not reach justified conclusions about the origin and development of the human race (since it is the only one of which we have knowledge). “The implausibility of these consequences,” he writes, “leads us to doubt the original objection, which is indeed totally misguided.”
It is misguided, Swinburne explains, because uniqueness is relative to description and every object is unique under some description. This is true of both spatial descriptions (p occupies such-and-such a location) and qualitative descriptions (p has such-and-such a property). In this, then, the universe is no different from any other object. [2] And so it follows that if we rigorously apply the principle that inferences cannot be made about unique objects and events, then since all objects and events are in some way unique, it becomes impossible to make inferences about anything at all. Moreover, both the universe and all objects it contains are characterised by properties which are common to more than one object. For instance: The universe, in common with the solar system, is a configuration of material bodies distributed in empty space; and like other objects, the universe has a certain density and mass. Swinburne concludes that, “the objection fails to make any crucial distinction between the universe and other objects; and so it fails in its attempt to prevent at the outset a rational inquiry into the issue of whether the universe has some origin outside itself.” All this should be borne in mind while reading the Modal Cosmological Argument, the Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Argument from Cosmic Teleology.
Having settled these four preliminary matters, us now move to the first argument for the existence of God.
[1] If p is more probable than not-p it is irrational to deny p and affirm not-p. But if it is significantly more probable that p than not-p it is irrational to deny both p and not-p on the basis of a lack of certain knowledge. If you are expecting a visit from your friend, a policeman, at 3 o'clock and at 2:58 your wife tells you that a man in a police uniform is walking down the drive it is on balance far more probable than not that it is your friend: Although you do not have certain knowledge, and could therefore be wrong, it would be irrational to reason, "I do not have certain knowledge that it is my friend; therefore, I deny that it is my friend and that it isn't my friend." Rational obligations can apply even in the absence of certain knowledge.
[2] In this connection Swinbune compares the universe with his writing table. The universe, spatially and qualitatively described, is the only physical object consisting of all physical objects spatially related to each other and not related to any other object that is subject to certain laws of nature from specified initial conditions. His writing table, meanwhile, is the one and only writing table of its kind in such an such an apartment having such and such a weight and scratches on its surface that is subject to certain laws of nature from specified initial conditions.
[2] In this connection Swinbune compares the universe with his writing table. The universe, spatially and qualitatively described, is the only physical object consisting of all physical objects spatially related to each other and not related to any other object that is subject to certain laws of nature from specified initial conditions. His writing table, meanwhile, is the one and only writing table of its kind in such an such an apartment having such and such a weight and scratches on its surface that is subject to certain laws of nature from specified initial conditions.