The Coherence of Theism
8
Conclusion
My concern has been to show that theism is coherent, where “theism” is understood to be the proposition, There exists an immaterial spirit who is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, necessary, eternal and perfectly good and “coherent” is understood to mean, Containing or entailing no contradictions. In practical terms, this has involved discharging objections to the concept of an immaterial person in general; an immaterial person with divine attributes in particular; and the existence of such a being given certain basic features of human experience—namely, the problem of evil and divine hiddenness. So long as all the objections to theism are defeasible in the way I have suggested, the existence of God is a logical possibility. Have we therefore gained rational permission to look at evidence for his existence? Not quite. For even allowing that it is not logically impossible that God exists, there are three final objections that a skeptic can make against entertaining evidence for the existence of God. I will address these now.
The Intrinsic Probability of Theism
Before moving to consider the positive arguments for the existence of God, a preliminary question needs to be asked: How likely is it that God exists? Consider the case of John and Jane. John assumes that the existence of God is profoundly unlikely. He therefore views theistic proofs with deep suspicion and finds them unpersuasive. Jane, on the other hand, assumes that the existence and nonexistence of God are about equiprobable. She therefore views those same proofs with an open mind and finds them persuasive. The point is that our presuppositions about the intrinsic probability of theism (where the "intrinsic probability" of a hypothesis is a measure of its simplicity prior to the evidence) are crucial to the outcome of any discussion of evidence for the existence of God and need to be taken into account. [1]
On superficial inspection is tempting to think that John is correct. The existence of God is about as improbable as anything could be. God, if he exists, is unlimited: infinite in power, knowledge and love. The principle of parsimony, which recommends the simpler of any two competing explanations, would seem to recommend an atheistic explanation in every possible case: whenever there are two possible explanations for the evidence, one which appeals to the existence of God and one which does not, the explanation which does not appeal to the existence of God is simpler and therefore has greater intrinsic probability. Prejudice against theistic claims is, it seems, justified.
However, in The Existence of God, Swinburne presents a strong counterargument to this view. He first notes that to postulate a limited force is to postulate two things: The force and whatever constrains it; while to postulate an unlimited force is to postulate one thing: The force, which, being unlimited, is not constrained by anything. "For this reason," he continues, "scientists have always favoured a hypothesis ascribing zero or infinite value to some entity over a hypothesis ascribing a finite value when both hypotheses are compatible with the data." Thus, "the hypothesis that some particle has zero or infinite mass is simpler than the hypothesis that it has a mass of 0.3412 or a velocity of 301,000 kilometres per second."
Theism is the proposition that the ultimate explanation of the universe is a single immaterial entity which is of the simplest kind imaginable because it is unlimited. Since a person is, "a conscious entity that has rational thoughts, memories, moral awareness, intentions, continuity of identity and who is able to perform various basic and nonbasic actions," a person having zero powers would not be a person at all. It follows that in postulating a person with infinite powers the theist is postulating the simplest person logically possible. [2] The intrinsic probability of theism is, therefore, high.
Who Created God?
Allowing, then, that the existence of God is logically possible and entertainably parsimonious, a further objection is sometimes raised. It can be summarised as follows: "God, if he exists, is the most complex conceivable being; therefore, to postulate God to explain p is by definition to postulate an explanation more complex than whatever it is you are trying to explain. This leaves us with the more difficult question of explaining the explanation." This objection, which is reducible to the schoolyard teaser, Who created God? is the "central argument" of The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins.
Three things need to be said in response to this.
Divine Simplicity The first is that the key premise is false and hangs on the assumption that mental states are reducible to physical states and that the existence of an infinite mind therefore implies the existence of an infinitely complex physical substrate—analogous to an infinite computer or human brain. However, as we saw in Chapter 2, mental states are not reducible to physical brain states. Mind cannot possibly be explained in terms of the physical and so must be regarded as an essentially nonphysical phenomenon—as such, it plausibly lacks the "heterogeneity of parts" which Dawkins himself recommends as the indicator of complexity. The error consists in conflating the mind itself with the mind's ideas. A divine mind may certainly have complex ideas. It may be thinking, for instance, of the infinitesimal calculus while monitoring and controlling the status of every elementary particle in the universe. But being unembodied it lacks physical parts and so is reducible to a single supremely simple entity whose properties (consciousness, rationality, volition, and so on) are all essential to it.
Explanatory Termini The second point that needs to be made in response to the demand for an "explanation of the explanation" is that the same demand can be made of any final theory of the universe. In scaling up the ladder of metaphysical explanation, atheist and theist alike arrive at a final rung. There will be, for both, a final brute fact or explanatory terminus for which there can be no further explanation. Physicalism, for instance, is the claim that only the physical universe exists. "The universe," Bertrand Russell asserted, "just is." But this is every bit as much a metaphysical claim as theism. The atheist cannot, therefore, simply dismiss theistic proofs and rest his case; he needs to make his case in the court of philosophical analysis. There, our task will be to determine which of several competing explanatory termini (including theism and atheism) is on balance the most coherent. But demanding an "explanation of the explanation" is not a legitimate response to any final metaphysic under consideration because it entails an infinite regress: we can then demand an explanation of the explanation-of-the-explanation; and then an explanation of that—and so on ad infinitum. In order to recognise that some explanatory terminus it is the best, it is not necessary explain it. [3]
Uncaused Entities The third, final and most important point is that the question, Who created God? makes a category mistake. In postulating the existence of God the theist is postulating an uncaused and eternal being. Asking, "What caused the uncaused?" is akin to asking, "Who is the bachelor's wife?" Nor does defining God as uncaused insulate theism against rational critique. The atheist can object that the concept of God is incoherent or that there is no evidence to support his existence. But what the atheist cannot do is dismiss the concept of an uncaused being a priori because the theist is unable to tell him what caused it. Uncaused entities are not incoherent in principle; on the contrary, they are a legitimate concept in both philosophy and mathematics. [4] And critically, the atheist himself is postulating an uncaused entity in asserting that the physical is all that there is. When Bertrand Russell asserts that the universe "just is" he is asserting that the universe exists as a brute fact without cause or explanation. The question we must ask is which brute fact, the universe or God, is an inference to the best explanation from the philosophical and scientific evidence. And this is not resolved by pressing an objection against the theist that applies with equal force to the atheist.
The Identification of Unobservable Entities
The final objection that needs to be addressed before moving to the positive arguments for the existence of God concerns the possibility of identifying unobservable entities. An entomologist identifies a new species of moth by collecting a specimen; an astronomer studies the moons of Jupiter through his telescope; a neuroscientist uses a microscope to observe the activity of brain cells. But God, being immaterial, will by definition escape such direct empirical detection. What possible evidence, then, can be advanced in support of the claim that God exists? This objection, which goes back to David Hume and Immanuel Kant, is out of touch with modern scientific epistemology. As Swinburne explains,
|
There are valid rules of inference that can be applied to scientific evidence and which, if the premises are true, will lead to a justified belief in the existence of an unobservable entity. One of these, a disjunctive syllogism, was introduced in Chapter 2.
A or B. Not A. Therefore, B. |
In discussing physicalism, we saw that mental states are either reducible to physical brain states or they are not; and, since they are not, the mind is more plausibly than not nonphysical. In this and many other cases, there may be only two possible conclusions: one entailing the existence of an observable and the other an unobservable. Suppose, for instance, that the following statement is true: Either space and time has no cause or the cause of the universe transcends space and time. Ruling out the first will provide evidence for the second even though, by definition, it is unobservable.
Another important law of inference in arguments for the existence of God is the so-called abductive argument, or "inference to the best explanation."
Another important law of inference in arguments for the existence of God is the so-called abductive argument, or "inference to the best explanation."
The surprising fact p is observed If q were true, p would follow as a matter of course Therefore, probably, q |
Let p here represent, say, the fine tuning of the laws and constants of the universe and suppose that we assemble a pool of candidate explanations for q: Chance, A multiverse, and A transcendent intelligence. Here, again, successfully ruling out the first alternative will provide evidence for either one of two unobservable entities.
Conclusion
I have now completed my defence of theism against the charge of a priori incoherence: I have shown that objections to the concept of God are defeasible and, therefore, that the existence of God logically possible. I have also shown that theism is a parsimonious hypothesis of high intrinsic probability and that God is an acceptable explanatory terminus to a final theory of the universe. And I have shown that unobservable entities, such as God, are within the scope of scientific epistemology. Moreover, in accomplishing these tasks, we have seen that mind is an essentially nonphysical phenomenon (which supports theistic claims about the existence of immaterial persons) and discussed one entertainable a priori argument for the existence of God which resists disproof. I conclude that we have therefore established the coherence of theism and have earned rational permission to examine the arguments and evidence for the existence of God. This is the subject of Part II.
Conclusion
I have now completed my defence of theism against the charge of a priori incoherence: I have shown that objections to the concept of God are defeasible and, therefore, that the existence of God logically possible. I have also shown that theism is a parsimonious hypothesis of high intrinsic probability and that God is an acceptable explanatory terminus to a final theory of the universe. And I have shown that unobservable entities, such as God, are within the scope of scientific epistemology. Moreover, in accomplishing these tasks, we have seen that mind is an essentially nonphysical phenomenon (which supports theistic claims about the existence of immaterial persons) and discussed one entertainable a priori argument for the existence of God which resists disproof. I conclude that we have therefore established the coherence of theism and have earned rational permission to examine the arguments and evidence for the existence of God. This is the subject of Part II.
[1] Some philosophers do not recognise the concept of "intrinsic probability." Plantinga, for example, thinks it is doubtful that there is such thing as intrinsic logical probability but concedes that, "we certainly do favour simplicity and we are inclined to think that simple explanations and hypotheses are more likely to be true than complicated epicyclic ones." The reader who shares this view can simply equate "intrinsic probability" with the notion that, all things being equal, the simpler a hypothesis the more likely it is to be true.
[2] In common usage a "person" is, of course, a human being. The reader should recall that the word is being used in its philosophical sense; that is, "a conscious entity that has rational thoughts, memories, moral awareness, intentions, continuity of identity and who is able to perform various basic and nonbasic actions."
[3] To illustrate this elementary precept of scientific reasoning, William Lane Craig invites us to imagine a group of archeologists who unearth artifacts resembling jewellery, pottery shards and arrowheads. They would be justified, he points out, in inferring that these object were the products of some unknown group of people rather than the results of the chance processes of sedimentation. And the fact that the archeologists cannot tell us who these unknown people were or how the artefacts came to be there in no way invalidates their explanation.
[4] As John Lennox, Oxford professor of mathematics, expressed it: "The set of the uncaused in not empty." It very plausibly already includes mathematical and logical truths, moral values and metaphysical universals.
[2] In common usage a "person" is, of course, a human being. The reader should recall that the word is being used in its philosophical sense; that is, "a conscious entity that has rational thoughts, memories, moral awareness, intentions, continuity of identity and who is able to perform various basic and nonbasic actions."
[3] To illustrate this elementary precept of scientific reasoning, William Lane Craig invites us to imagine a group of archeologists who unearth artifacts resembling jewellery, pottery shards and arrowheads. They would be justified, he points out, in inferring that these object were the products of some unknown group of people rather than the results of the chance processes of sedimentation. And the fact that the archeologists cannot tell us who these unknown people were or how the artefacts came to be there in no way invalidates their explanation.
[4] As John Lennox, Oxford professor of mathematics, expressed it: "The set of the uncaused in not empty." It very plausibly already includes mathematical and logical truths, moral values and metaphysical universals.